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CONTRACTS DURING THE HALF-CENTURY
BETWEEN RESTATEMENTS
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH*
A S THE ROARING TWENTIES DREW TO A CLOSE a little over a half-
century ago, Samuel Williston was nearing the end of his task as
Reporter for the first Restatement of Contracts. He was already in his
late sixties, his great treatise had been published nearly a decade
before, and he was beyond dispute the preeminent American authority
in his field. Over the next fifty years, the Restatement on which he was
at work was to become the brightest jewel in the American Law In-
stitute's crown of Restatements.
In May of 1979, as the sobering seventies drew to a close, I had the
privilege of presenting to the membership of the Institute the final
chapter of Restatement Second of Contracts. The three volumes of that
Restatement have now been published. I shall not hazard a guess as to
how it will fare over the next fifty years. I would like instead to use the
time we have together to reflect on what has happened in the law of
contracts over the course of the half century between the two contracts
Restatements- roughly 1930 to 1980.
Many of you are law students, accustomed to assimilating cases at a
dizzying pace, reaching a crescendo as examinations approach. As far as
time and place are concerned the cases come almost at random-an Ohio
case from the middle of the nineteenth century, followed by a California
case with a Traynor opinion from only two decades ago, followed by a
New York case from the era of Cardozo early in this century-and so
on. I invite you reflect on what has happened in one field of law in which
you have already invested much time and effort during a relatively
short period in its history-to step back a little from your immediate
concerns in order to get a fresh perspective.
I shall try to do so too, for it is much the same for reporters as it is for
law students. One is always concerned with the chapter at hand-in
presenting it first to the advisers, then to the Council, and finally to the
membership of the Institute. One might suppose that at the end of an
enterprise that occupied some fifteen years, the reporter and his ad-
visers would have had one last year to reflect on their product as a
* Alfred McCormick Professor of Law of Columbia University and Reporter
for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts from 1971-80. This article is a slightly
revised version of a Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture, delivered at the
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whole and make some final revisions. But the Institute approves its
restatements chapter by chapter, year by year, and seeks to avoid
reopening matters that have once been laid to rest. In the spring of 1979
its membership was asked not only to approve the final chapter but to
give final approval to the project as a whole. This left the reporter with
scant time for reflection.
Since the spring of 1979, however, I have been provided with an occa-
sion for reflection on the enterprise as a whole. The Columbia Law
Review devoted its January 1981 issue to a symposium on the Second
Restatement of Contracts, marking its publication.' Preparing my con-
tribution to that symposium and reading the contributions of others
have helped give me perspective on what has happened to contract law
over the last fifty years.
What has happened in the fifty years between Restatements? For one
thing, there has been an enormous explosion of statutory law affecting
contracts, notably the Uniform Commercial Code and the legislation for
protection of consumers. For another, there has been greater emphasis
on substance over form, exemplified by the widespread abolition of the
seal as a means of making enforceable promises. For a third, there has
been an increasing recognition of the concept of reliance as a companion
and sometimes rival of the traditional concept of expectation. I shall
speak almost exclusively of the third-the increased recognition of
reliance.
As a point of departure, consider the following illustration in the style
of the Restatement: A makes a promise to B. B makes a return promise
to A. Before B has done anything, A fails or refuses to perform. B sues
A for breach of contract.
Much of the first Restatement was devoted to situations of this
sort-a breach of what it described as a bilateral contract wholly ex-
ecutory on both sides. Was defendant A's promise an offer? Was plain-
tiff B's promise an acceptance? Was there consideration for defendant
A's promise? If plaintiff B can enforce defendant A's promise, what
damages will a court award? Is the Statute of Frauds a bar to relief? Is
defendant A's promise voidable on the ground of mental infirmity or
mistake? Misrepresentation or duress? Is defendant A relieved of his
duty to perform because of impracticability of performance or frustra-
tion of purpose? The first Restatement devoted many sections to these
questions. It concluded, of course, that if all the other questions were
resolved favorably to plaintiff B, he could recover his lost expecta-
tion-the "benefit of his bargain" -including any lost profit. He could
recover this without regard to the fact that he had done nothing in
reliance on defendant A's promise, either by performing himself or by
spending money in preparing to perform.





The Restatement Second is also concerned with the wholly executory
bilateral contract (though it no longer uses the word "bilateral").' But it
has heightened concern with the role of reliance. Suppose the defendant
A's promise was not an offer. Might plaintiff B's reliance on it make it
enforceable? Suppose that defendant A's promise was an offer but that
he tried to revoke it before plaintiff B accepted. Might plaintiff B's
reliance on the offer preclude defendant A's revocation? Or suppose
that defendant A's promise was an offer but that it was unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds. Might plaintiff B's reliance on the pro-
mise remove the bar of the statute? We shall consider other questions
involving reliance later, but for the moment let us concentrate on these
three questions, all of which relate to the effect of reliance on whether a
promise is enforceable.
As you will recall, what was said in the first Restatement about the
effect of reliance on whether a promise is enforceable related only to the
first of these three questions. It was said in the now famous section on
"promissory estoppel" (although the Restatement itself avoids that
term, in that section 90 is entitled "Promise Reasonably Inducing
Definite and Substantial Action").' Professor Knapp, in his contribution
to the Columbia symposium on the Restatement, notes that Williston's
placement of that revolutionary section "in the company of such modest
and familiar notions as the promise to pay a debt discharged in
bankruptcy was like putting Pavarotti in a barbershop quartet."' In the
laconic style that marked the first Restatement, Williston provided no
commentary except for four illustrations. Here is the third: A promises
B that if B will go to college and complete his course he will give him
$5,000. B goes to college and has nearly completed his course when A
notifies him of an intention to revoke the promise. A's promise is binding.5
Although the first Restatement has no reporter's notes to give us the
inspiration of its illustration, a leading case in support of section 90 was
Ricketts v. Scothorn,6 decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in
1898, when Williston, in his late thirties, had been teaching at Harvard
for nearly a decade. In Ricketts, John Ricketts promised to pay his
granddaughter Katie Scothorn, a "working girl" who earned $10 a week,
$2,000 so "that you have not got to work any more."' She quit work, but
when old John died, his executor refused to honor the promise, and
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1, Reporter's Note to Com-
ment f (1981) (definitions of unilateral and bilateral contracts have "not been car-
ried forward because of doubt as to the utility of the distinction.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Prom-
issory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981).
5 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90, Illustration 3 (1932).
' 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
1 Id. at 51, 77 N.W. at 366.
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Katie sued John's estate. John had come perilously close to bargaining
by making an offer that Katie could accept by quitting work, just as A
had come perilously close to bargaining for B's going to college.
However, the Nebraska court declined to take the approach that the
New York Court of Appeals had taken in Hamer v. Sidway,8 decided only
seven years earlier in 1891. Since John Ricketts "exacted no quid pro
quo ... and looked for nothing in return,"9 there was no consideration
for his promise. Nonetheless, the trial court's judgment in Katie's favor
was affirmed on the ground that, having intentionally influenced Katie
"to alter her position for the worse on the faith of [his promise], it would
be grossly inequitable to permit [John], or his executor, to resist pay-
ment on the ground that the promise was given without
consideration."10
Between Restatements, section 90 received virtually unanimous
judicial and academic approval. There were, however, very few square
holdings by courts of last resort and the cases generally, with an excep-
tion to be noted shortly, involved reliance on gratuitous promises. A
representative case with which many of you are familiar is Feinberg v.
Pfeiffer Co.," decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1959, enforc-
ing a corporation's promise of a pension after the employee had relied
on it by resigning her job. It came as no surprise when section 90 found
its way into the Restatement Second with relatively few modifications,
the most significant of which we shall discuss later. It is now supported
by five pages of exegesis, including seventeen illustrations-one of
them involving B who again goes to college in reliance on A's promise to
give him $5,000.12 (Presumably, at today's inflated prices, B also has a
handsome scholarship.) Indeed, though the numbers of the sections of
the Restatement Second have generally been changed so that they do
not follow the first, this change was so contrived that the number of sec-
tion 90 remains unchanged.' 3
What is of more interest to us than the fact that section 90 remains
largely intact is that it has been joined by several other provisions
under which reliance may also make a promise enforceable. I shall refer
only to the two most significant of these extensions of the principle of
the original section 90.
One of these deals with the second of the three questions raised
earlier: Is defendant A precluded from revoking his offer once plaintiff
8 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
1 57 Neb. 51, 52, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (1898).
10 Id.
" 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment a, Illustration 1
(1981).
"3 Minor changes were made so that § 90 and § 45 (option contract created by




B has relied on it? This is dealt with in section 87 of the Restatement
Second entitled "Option Contract."14 It admits of the possibility that
reliance on an unaccepted offer may make it irrevocable. An idea of its
import is given by one of its illustrations:
A submits a written offer for paving work to be used by B as a
partial basis for B's bid as general contractor on a large build-
ing. As A knows, B is required to name his sub-contractors in his
general bid. B uses A's offer and B's bid is accepted. A's offer is
irrevocable until B has had a reasonable opportunity to notify A
of the award and B's acceptance of A's offer."
This is, of course, a thinly disguised statement of the facts in Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 6 decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1958,
shortly before work began on the Restatement Second. Thirty-five
years earlier, Learned Hand had written in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros."' that there was "no room" in the field of offer and acceptance "for
the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.' .... At that time all of the cases
supporting section 90, as well as all of the illustrations to that section,
involved gratuitous promises rather than offers looking to acceptance.
In Drennan, however, Justice Traynor took a different view. Analogiz-
ing from section 45 of the first Restatement, 9 he found an implied sub-
sidiary promise by the subcontractor to keep his offer open which
became binding because of the contractor's reliance. Hand's view still
had a few adherents, but the Restatement Second's endorsement of
Traynor's position has helped to assure that it will prevail.
The other significant extension of the principle under the original sec-
tion 90 comes in section 139.20 It admits of the possibility that reliance
on a promise that would otherwise be unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds may make the promise enforceable. Its import can be
seen from this illustration:
A is a pilot with an established airline having rights to con-
tinued employment, and could take up to six months leave with-
out prejudice to those rights. He takes such leave to become
general manager of B, a small airline which hopes to expand if a
certificate to operate over an important route is granted. When
his six months leave (from the established airline) is about to ex-
pire, A demands definite employment (with B, the small airline)
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76, Comment e, Illustration 6
(1981).
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
i 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
,8 Id at 346.
'g RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
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because of that fact, and B orally agrees to employ A for two
years and on the granting of the certificate to give A an increase
in salary and a written contract. In reliance of this agreement A
lets his right to return to his prior employer expire. The certifi-
cate is soon granted, but A is discharged in breach of the agree-
ment. The Statute of Frauds does not prevent recovery of
damages by A.
This illustration is derived from Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson,2' decid-
ed by the Ninth Circuit in 1954. In that case an airplane pilot recovered
damages from the airline for breach of its oral promise of employment.
In rejecting the airline's defense of the Statute of Frauds, the Ninth Cir-
cuit quoted section 90 of the first Restatement and concluded "that
there was an intention to carry promissory estoppel (or call it what you
will) into the [S]tatute of [F]rauds if the additional factor of a promise to
reduce the contract to writing is present."22 This is a somewhat perplex-
ing explanation. Courts had traditionally held that the bar of the
Statute of Frauds could be removed by equitable estoppel as dis-
tinguished from promissory estoppel. 3 The essence of equitable estop-
pel was reliance on a misrepresentation of fact and not on a promise to
perform, for example, a promisor's misrepresentation that he intended
to put his promise in writing when he did not so intend. What the Ninth
Circuit found significant was that the airline had promised to put the
contract in writing, and such a promise to make a written contract in
the future meets the test of the Restatement.
Before returning to the Restatement Second, I want to remind you of
another case, Monarco v. Lo Greco,"4 decided by the Supreme Court of
California in 1950, four years before Alaska Airlines. When Christie Lo
Greco was eighteen years old, he lived on the family farm with his
mother and stepfather. They orally promised Christie that if he stayed
on the farm and participated in the family venture they would leave the
bulk of their property to him, Christie did as they asked, and the family
venture prospered. But when his stepfather died, twenty years later, he
left the property to his grandson in breach of promise to his stepson
Christie. On consulting a lawyer, Christie learned that his stepfather's
promise of twenty years before came within the Statute of Frauds and
that it was therefore unenforceable. Of course, if the promise could not
be enforced, Christie was in theory entitled to restitution in a sum equal
to the amount by which his services over twenty years had enriched his
stepfather. But in practice, he was unlikely to be able to prove what this
21 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 298.
2 See, e.g., Roberts v. Fulmer, 301 N.Y. 277, 93 N.E.2d 846 (1950); see also
Porter v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1932).




amount was with sufficient certainty to satisfy a court. His lawyer,
therefore, argued that the bar of the Statute of Frauds should be remov-
ed even though there had been no mispresentation "with respect to the
requirements of the statute," such as a misrepresentation "that a
writing . . . will be executed ... "25 The Supreme Court of California
agreed and held for Christie, but Justice Traynor's opinion alluded to
the fact that Christie would not have succeeded had he claimed restitu-
tion. He carefully noted that because of the benefit conferred by
Christie the case was one in which "unjust enrichment would result
from refusal to enforce the contract.
' 2 6
These two cases were at the frontier of the development of the law in
this area when section 139 was drafted. In Alaska Airlines the promisee
had relied on the promisor's promise to put the contract in writing. In
Monarco the promisee had conferred a benefit on the promisor that
would have resulted in unjust enrichment. Yet section 139 was broadly
drafted and requires neither reliance nor unjust enrichment. Its breadth
was soon to cause controversy in the grain cases.
Beginning in the summer of 1973, sharp increases in the price of grain
instigated a plethora of cases in the grain belt. Farmers had made oral
contracts to sell to grain elevators. When the price of grain rose, they
sold their grain on the market at the higher price and reneged on their
oral contracts with the elevators. When sued, they set up the Statute of
Frauds as a defense. The elevators argued that they had relied on the
farmers' promise by making contracts to resell the grain to others, and
that the farmers were therefore precluded from setting up the statute
as a defense.
The grain cases were distinguished from the Alaska Airlines case
because the farmers had not promised to put their contracts in writing,
and they were distinguished from the Monarco case because the grain
elevators had conferred no benefit on the farmers that would result in
their unjust enrichment. There was just reliance by the elevators on the
farmers' promise to perform. Some of the many courts that heard the
grain cases gave the traditional answer that the Statute of Frauds ap-
plied.27 But others, relying heavily on the broad statement in section
139, held that the farmers were precluded from setting up the statute as
a defense.28 These cases show an extraordinary influence by the Restate-
ment Second in accelerating the recognition of reliance.
It is worth mentioning in passing that these cases also illustrate the
other two developments between Restatements that I singled out
earlier. They show the explosion of statutory law affecting contracts,
25 Id at 623, 220 P.2d at 740.
Id.
E.g., Farmland Serv. Coop. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
E.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979).
1981]
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here the Uniform Commercial Code, since the Statute of Frauds provi-
sion involved was section 2-201 of the Code.29 And they clearly show the
emphasis of substance over form. But what is important for our pur-
poses is their significance with respect to the effect of reliance on
whether a promise is enforceable.
This concludes our consideration of our first group of sections of the
Restatement Second. They are section 90 (the basic section), section 87
(on the revocability of offers) and section 139 (on the Statute of Frauds).
All three evidence rules which are "plaintiffs' rules," in that they make
promises enforceable that would otherwise be unenforceable.
From this first group of sections on the effect of reliance on whether a
promise is enforceable, attention is now turned to a group of sections
that deals with reliance as a limit on the enforcement of promises. Are
there situations in which a promise will be enforced, but the injured party
will be limited to his reliance as distinguished from his expectation in-
terest?
Williston would have answered no. His view was that a promise was
either enforceable to the full extent of the injured party's expectation,
including such elements as his lost profits, or it was not enforceable at
all. Of course, if the injured party's proof failed to show his lost profits,
he might be awarded damages based on his out-of-pocket expenses, but
this did not refute Williston's fundamental tenet that the injured party
was in principle entitled to his full expectation if he could prove it. He
saw no place for what Professor Young has called "half measures" in his
submission to the Columbia symposium." The issue came to a head in
the discussion when section 90 was presented to the Institute's annual
meeting in 1926. In answer to an intervention by a member of the In-
stitute, Williston said:
Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is bind-
ing it has to be enforced as it is made. . . . I could leave this
whole thing to the subject of quasi contracts so that the prom-
isee under those circumstances shall never recover on the prom-
ise but he shall recover such an amount as will fairly compen-
sate him for any injury incurred; but it seems to me you have to
take one leg or the other. You have either to say the promise is
binding or you have to go on the theory of restoring the status
quo.
31
In 1936 and 1937, a decade after this discussion, Professor Lon Fuller
published his remarkable two-part article entitled The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages.32 In the article he argued that courts had often
U.C.C. § 2-201.
Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19 (1981).
31 4 ALI PROC., app. 103-04 (1926).
' Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE




measured recovery by a party's reliance interest, as distinguished from
either his expectation interest or his restitution interest-the only two
alternatives as Williston saw things.
The impact of this article on the Restatement Second is readily ap-
parent from section 90 itself where a new sentence has been added to
the first version: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires."3 In other words, it is within the court's discretion to
limit the plaintiff to damages based on his reliance interest rather than
on his expectation interest. The Restatement Second gives four ex-
amples, but for our purposes it may be best to consider a fifth and
apocryphal illustration that I have made up for this purpose:
A promise B, who is a college senior, that he will give him $5,000
when he sees him at the graduation ceremonies. B, who had not
planned to go to the ceremonies, buys a cap and gown for $100 and
goes to the ceremonies, but A refuses to perform his promise.
Assuming that this is a situation in which a court would enforce A's pro-
mise on the principle of section 90, might it not be just for the court to
limit B's recovery to the $100 he has spent (his reliance interest) rather
than the $5,000 he was promised (his expectation interest)? The Restate-
ment Second's version of section 90 states that the court has discretion
to so limit B's recovery. Similar language appears in the other two sec-
tions discussed earlier- section 87 (on the revocability of offers) and sec-
tion 139 (on the Statute of Frauds).
But these are all sections in which it is reliance that makes the pro-
mise enforceable in the first place. It is not so surprising that enforce-
ment should be limited to the reliance interest in such cases. But what
of situations in which the promise is enforceable because of considera-
tion rather than reliance? Consider, for example, our simple introduc-
tory illustration in which A and B exchange promises and B sued A.
Might enforcement of A's promise sometimes be limited to B's reliance
interest?
To this question the Restatement Second gives an affirmative answer
in section 351(3)." That section admits of the possibility that a court may
limit recovery for loss "by excluding recovery for loss of profits by
allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it
concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid
disproportionate compensation."3 Even if the loss was foreseeable,
unavoidable and is proved with certainty, a court may in some cir-
cumstances limit recovery to the reliance interest. To what kind of case
does this rule apply? Perhaps an obvious case is that of the hardware
dealer who sells a defective nail, which causes the loss of the horseshoe,
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment c, Illustration 6
(1981).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981).
3 1d.
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which causes the loss of the horse, which causes the loss of the rider,
which causes the loss of the battle, which causes the loss of the war. If
the buyer alerts the hardware dealer to this risk before buying the nail,
is the dealer liable for the resulting loss? For another case, one of the il-
lustrations may help:
A, a plastic surgeon, makes a contract with B, a professional
entertainer, to perform plastic surgery on her face in order to
improve her appearance. The result of the surgery is, however,
to disfigure her face and to require a second operation. In an ac-
tion by B against A for breach of contract, the court may limit
damages by allowing recovery only for loss occurred by B in re-
liance on the contract, including the fees paid by B and expenses
for hospitalization, nursing care and medicine for both oper-
ations, together with any damages for the worsening of B's
appearance if these can be proved with reasonable certainty,
but not including any loss resulting from the failure to improve
her appearance. a6
The case is Sullivan v. O'Connor," decided by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 1973, in which Mrs. Alice Sullivan sued Dr.
James H. O'Connor for breach of a contract to give her a "Hedy
Lamarr" nose.38 The court did not, however, have to face this issue.
Although Mrs. Sullivan claimed at trial her expectation interest, "the
difference in value between the nose as promised and the nose as it ap-
peared after the operations," '39 she abandoned her claim on appeal.
However, Justice Benjamin Kaplan suggested in dictum that the proper
measure would not be the expectation interest; instead, "a different and
generally more lenient measure of damages is to be applied in patient-
physician actions based on breach of alleged special agreements to af-
fect a cure, attain a stated result, or employ a given medical method,"4
a measure designed "to put the plaintiff back in the position he occupied
just before the parties entered upon the agreement, to compensate him
for the detriments he suffered in reliance upon the agreement."41
In sum, the reliance interest is used as a limit on recovery, short of
the expectation interest, in this second group of sections. The group
consists of sections 90, 87 and 139, under which the promise is en-
forceable because of reliance and of section 351(3), under which the pro-
mise is enforceable because of consideration. The sections in this group
state what might be called "defendants' rules," since they limit
Id Comment f, Illustration 19.
363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
See R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 22-23 (1978).
363 Mass. at 580, 296 N.E.2d at 185.
40 Id at 582, 296 N.E.2d at 185.




recovery, in contrast to the sections in the first group, which state
"plaintiffs' rights."
Now let us look at the third group of Restatement Second sections.
Consider once again our simple introductory illustration in which A and
B exchanged promises and B sued A. What if plaintiff B has relied on
defendant A's promise and it then turns out that the promise is voidable
on the ground of mental illness or mistake? What if plaintiff B has relied
on defendant A's promise and it then turns out that defendant A is
relieved of his duty to perform on the ground of impracticability of per-
formance or frustration of purpose? In these situations plaintiff B can-
not enforce defendant A's promise -plaintiff B cannot recover his ex-
pectation including lost profits. But is he to go uncompensated for his
actual reliance on defendant A's promise?
At this point we must distinguish between reliance by plaintiff B that
also confers a benefit on defendant A and reliance by plaintiff B that
does not confer such a benefit. For example, if plaintiff B's reliance
takes the form of payment of part of the price or part performance of
some other sort, defendant A will receive a benefit from it. But if plain-
tiff B's reliance consists of "start up" costs such as tooling up in
preparation for performance, defendant A will receive no benefit from
it.
This distinction is important because plaintiff B clearly has the right
to recover for such reliance which has conferred a benefit on defendant
A. His right is not based on his reliance as such, but is instead a right to
restitution of the benefit he has conferred on defendant A in order to
avoid unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, courts have shown great skill at what Professor Perillo,
in his contribution to the Columbia symposium, termed the " 'legal
alchemy,' transmuting reliance damages into 'benefits conferred' simply
by so labelling them."42 Suppose, for example, that plaintiff B has relied
by partly performing a promise to build a bridge that now will be
useless to defendant A, who has been relieved of his duty on the ground
of frustration of purpose. Though it may seem strained to say that par-
tial construction of a useless bridge is a "benefit" to defendant A, a
court might well reach this conclusion and allow plaintiff B restitution
based on unjust enrichment. The reasoning runs: If defendant A
bargained for this performance and received at least part of it, he has to
that extent been benefited whether the part performance is now of use
to him or not.4" Indeed, in measuring the benefit in dollars, the court
may well use the contract price as a yardstick."
42 Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 37, 39 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Perillo].
, E.g., Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143 (1917).
" E.g., Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891).
1981]
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But this "legal alchemy" has its limits, and there can be no restitu-
tionary recovery if there is no benefit to defendant A-whether in the
form of an actual benefit or an imputed one through part performance of
a promise that he once wanted. Can plaintiff B nevertheless recover for
his reliance, even though it admittedly has resulted in no benefit to
defendant A?
Our last group of sections of the Restatement Second gives an affir-
mative answer, giving rise to what Professor Perillo referred to as a
"newborn writ ... an action for reliance."45 One of this group of sections,
section 158,46 deals with the consequences of avoidance for mutual
mistake. Another, section 272,"7 deals with the consequences of
discharge on the ground of impracticability of performance or frustra-
tion of purpose. Both sections use identical language. After stating that
either party may "have a claim for relief including restitution," they go
on to say that if this "will not avoid injustice, the court may grant relief
on such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties'
reliance interest. ' '
48
This language, of which Professor Perillo and Young both make
much,49 came into the Restatement Second in some haste and almost as
an afterthought. An earlier version of these sections, approved in ten-
tative draft by the Institute, said that if restitution and other traditional
relief "will not avoid injustice, the court may ... supply a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances.""0 The court's function was thus con-
ceived to be one of filling a "gap" for which the parties had not provid-
ed.
The change to the present language was made in the last year before
final editing, in connection with the work on remedies. It was not in-
tended to have substantive significance. One reason for making the
change was simply to bring these two sections into conformity with a
third section, section 15,"1 which deals with avoidance for mental illness
or defect. That section provided in tentative draft that a person could
avoid a contract on that ground with an exception. The exception ap-
plied where the contract was made on fair terms with someone who had
no knowledge of the mental illness or defect. The power of avoidance
"terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in
whole or in part or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance
4 Perillo, supra note 42, at 40.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 (1981).
41 Id. § 272 (1981).
18 Id. §§ 158, 272.
41 Perillo, supra note 42, at 40; Young, supra note 30, at 30.
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 292(2) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974); id
§ 300(2) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975) (in which the word "which" had been changed
to "that").




would be unjust." 2 In a final sentence, the tentative draft said: "In such
a case a court may grant relief on such equitable terms as the situation
requires."" This seemed stylistically out of kilter with the "justice re-
quires" language used in section 90 and related sections, however, and it
was changed to: "In such a case a court may grant relief as justice re-
quires."54 It would be hard to find much substance in this change.
Once this had been done, however, it was difficult to explain why one
formula had been used here, and a different formula used for mistake,
impracticability and frustration, since the situations were very similar.
Thus the language of sections 158 and 272 was changed to bring it closer
to that of section 15. The "gap filling" language was taken out and
replaced by: "ITihe court may grant relief on such terms as justice re-
quires," and since this seemed to be unnecessarily vague, the words "in-
cluding protection of the parties' reliance interests" were added.
5
This was done in the final year of consideration. Our major concern
was with the lengthy and controversial remedies chapter; there was little
attention paid to a change in wording that most of us reported as essen-
tially a matter of housekeeping.
I have detailed this for you not because of any intrinsic interest that
it may have, but to suggest to you that it is not always wise to assume
that such changes in the drafting process are intended to have substan-
tive significance. Nevertheless, the language is there, an invitation to
courts to use more rather than less discretion. There is little case law as
of this time-no Drennan, Stephenson or Sullivan case. It will be in-
teresting to see what courts make out of this last group of sections.
Note that this third group of sections is, like the first, "plaintiffs' law,"
since the invitation to the court is to grant relief that is more generous
than would be granted on a restitution theory.
This, then, is my view of contracts during the half-century between
Restatements. What developments are to come over the next fifty years
will depend in large part on young persons such as yourselves who will
replenish the bar, the judiciary and the law faculties during that time.
52 Id § 15(2) (1981).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 180(2) (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (1981).
5 Id §§ 158(2), 272(2).
1981]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss3/5
